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The Politics of Fiscal Austerity: Democracies

and Foresight
PAUL L. POSNER*
ABSTRACT
Dauntingfiscal policy challenges face democratic systems throughout
the world. Fiscal austerity in the wake of the Great Recession prompted
nations in the Organisationfor Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) to institute major spending cuts and tax increases, increases
that caused political and social fallout for years to come. While
economies and budgets have improved in the past several years,
significant fiscal adjustments lie ahead due to agingpopulations and the
seemingly inexorable growth of health care costs. Faced with larger
cohorts of retirees and fewer workers, nations will have to come to grips
with a fiscal reality of higher spending and lower revenues for the
foreseeable future. This article examines whether and how fiscal
austerity measures are politically stabilizing or destabilizing for elected
leaders responsible for their imposition. Many would predict that
democracies are ill suited to make these hard choices, and certainly
regimes have gone down to defeat following the formulation of austerity
programs. However, the record is mixed-many regimes have found
strategies to mitigate the political fallout and guarantee reelection in the
wake of austerity. While traditional incremental and pluralist politics
continue to characterize the budgetary strategies of many systems, major
policy reforms have risen to the center of policy agendas elsewhere. While
the magnitude of the fiscal crisis prompted the adoption of major policy
shifts in hard-pressednations, such reforms were undergirded by a more
volatile policy process featuringthe emergence of new pathways to power
with greater roles for experts and symbolically compelling ideas.
* Professor and director of the Master of Public Administration program at George
Mason University. This Paper was prepared for the Conference on Law and the
Globalization of Austerity at the Maurer School of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington,
on September 11 and 12, 2014. I would like to thank Matthew Sommerfeld, a Ph.D.
candidate in political science at George Mason University, for his valuable assistance on
this paper.
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INTRODUCTION

Advanced nations face nearly unprecedented fiscal challenges, both
for the medium and long term. Nearly unparalleled fiscal ambiguity
clouds budgeting, as both forces demanding fiscal consolidation and
advocating growth and stimulus to invigorate stagnant economies
conflict nations. Daunting challenges lie ahead in the next several
decades for democratic nations and their leaders. With deficits and debt
rising to near-record levels in most nations, the recovery from the
recession will still leave significant fiscal gaps that must be addressed.
As they cope with the resulting fiscal imbalances, nations will also be
dealing with long-term fiscal pressures stemming from the aging of
populations and rising health care costs. Unlike previous recessions, the
return of strong growth will not eliminate the fiscal gaps facing these
nations, but will serve as the prelude to even more difficult and
wrenching choices.
The sustainability of national economies will ultimately require a
balance between near-term growth and longer-term fiscal consolidation.
The question that is now being raised is whether such actions are
politically sustainable. Many, in fact, would conclude that fiscal
consolidation is an unnatural political act--dooming governments to
certain defeat in subsequent elections. Recent elections seem to confirm
this: governments have lost power in nine Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) nations that imposed fiscal
austerity.. Political failure will bring about economic failure as skeptical
markets will rightly lose confidence in fiscal austerity regimes.
Ultimately, good economics depends on good politics.
In fact, many analysts and observers have concluded that
democratic nations will tend to procrastinate and adopt needed
spending and tax reforms only when a market-driven crisis arises to
demand action. Yet, waiting for a crisis has significant downsides.
Nations that wait for a crisis will face far larger fiscal adjustments.
Moreover, the recent political unrest in European nations attests that
implementing consolidation in the center of a crisis requires precipitous
changes to be instituted in short order, causing untold political and
social dislocation and risks to millions of people.'
As the OECD begins to emerge from the recession, the central
question is whether democratic nations can take proactive leadership
before a crisis forces action. A democratic system's capacity to exercise
fiscal self-restraint and foresight are among the central issues facing

1. See generally LORENZO
AGAINST THE WALL (2013).
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advanced systems today. This article examines the politics of fiscal
consolidations in OECD nations in recent years, and assesses whether
and how leaders attempted to resolve the tensions between the fiscal
and electoral imperatives they face.
I.

DEFICIT AND DEBT POSITION OF

OECD

MEMBER COUNTRIES

The Great Recession has had a staggering impact on fiscal policy.
Average national deficits for advanced economies spiked from 3.9
percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2008 to a high of 8.3 percent
in 2010, as shown in Table 1 below. General government debt rose from
80 percent of GDP for advanced economies in 2008 to over 107 percent
in 2014.2
Table 1: Fiscal balances, advanced nations: 2008-2015
Projections
2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Overall Balance (percent of GDP)
-2.5
World
-3,9
Advanced Economies
-2.1
Euro Area
-3.3
France
-0.1
Germany
-9.9
Greece
-7.3
Ireland'
-2.7
Italy
-3.7
Portugal
t
-4.5
Spain
-4.1
Japan
-5.0
United Kingdom
2.5
Others
2008 Sytem of National Accounts SVA)
-0.3
Canada
2
-7.8
United States

-4.5
-14.7

-4.9
-12.5

-3.7
-11.0

-3.4
-9.7

-3.0
-7.3

-2.5
-6.4

-2.0
-5.6

Source: Int'l Monetary Fund, Fiscal Monitor: Public Expenditure Reform, at 3 (Apr. 2014).

These burgeoning deficits and debt have prompted twenty-five
OECD nations to adopt plans to institute fiscal consolidation amounting
to nearly 6 percent of GDP from 2009 to 2013. Two-thirds of the
reduction in balances would come from the spending side, with the
3
remainder accounted for by tax increases.

2. Int'l Monetary Fund, Public Expenditure Reform: Making Difficult Choices, FISCAL
MONITOR 5 (Apr. 2014).
3. Mario Marcel, Budgeting for Fiscal Space and Government PerformanceBeyond the
Great Recession, 13 OECD J. ON BUDGETING 9,15 (2014).
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While all OECD nations experienced fiscal stress from the Great
Recession, their experiences varied considerably. OECD has grouped
nations into four categories, which illustrate the large variation of fiscal
pressures felt across advanced nations:
Group 1: Fiscal foresight-nations that brought
substantial surpluses into the crisis period such as
Sweden and Canada;
Group 2: Fiscal victims-nations who were fiscal victims
requiring bailouts such as Greece and Spain;
Group 3: Fiscal mitigation-nations whose stronger
economies buffered the full impact of the crisis such as
Germany; and
Group 4: Fiscal immune-nations with deep deficits
immune from debt market pressures such as the United
4
States and Japan.
The data in Table 2 show the different fiscal consequences the
financial crisis wrought for nations in each grouping. 5 Nations in the
fiscal foresight group faced the least change in balances and debt, while
nations in the fiscal victim group experienced the greatest increase in
deficits. The nations in the fiscal immune group, however, saw the
largest increases in gross debt, with Japan crossing the 200 percent of
GDP threshold.

4. Id. at 13.
5. Group 1 countries include: Australia, Canada, Finland, Korea, New Zealand, and
Sweden. Group 2 countries include: Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
and Spain. Group 3 countries include: Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. Group 4 countries
include: Japan, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id. at 14.
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Table 2: General government fiscal behavior by country
groupings: 2009-2013
Change in
Underlying Balance
Group 1

2.37

Change in
Primary
Spending
-3.52

Group 2
Group 3
Group 4
Total

7.95
2.85
2.75
3.32

-5.14
-2.29
-2.87
-3.16

Change
in Gross
Debt
1.71
13.41
12.16
24.21
17.66

Source: Mario Marcel, Budgeting for Fiscal Space and Government Performance Beyond
the Great Recession, 13 OECD J. ON BUDGETING 9, 14 (2014).

While the short-term fiscal deficits are difficult enough, many
OECD nations face longer-term fiscal consolidation requirements to
stabilize their debt-to-GDP ratios by 2025. According to these
calculations, Japan has the highest fiscal consolidation requirements
beyond 2011 followed by Ireland, the United States, and the United
Kingdom. The data presented in Figure 1 suggest that fiscal
consolidation will be on the agenda of many advanced nations long after
the financial crisis is over.
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Figure 1: Longer-term fiscal consolidation needs
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Source: ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK No. 91, at
207-08 (2012).

II. CAN DEMOCRACIES TAKE EARLY ACTION?

The foregoing suggests that leaders in OECD nations face a
daunting array of short- and long-term fiscal challenges. Fiscal gaps are
daunting, perhaps more daunting than at any time in postwar history.
According to recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) data, the
world's deficits will remain 3 percentage points larger in 2015 than in
2007-even though output gaps would have been closed. Beyond the
short-term, the United States and many European nations face the
longer-term problems of the unsustainable costs posed by an aging
society and rising health care costs.
Once the economies of OECD nations improve, the fiscal choices will
once again become a central and appropriate issue for national leaders
to address. As they face these choices, serious questions will be
answered about whether advanced democracies have the political
capacity to make the hard fiscal choices early enough to avoid a future
featuring serious economic and fiscal shortfalls and precipitous and
divisive political choices. Herbert Stein, chair of the Council of Economic
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Advisers under Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, 6 famously
said: "[i]f something cannot go on forever, it will stop." 7 But there is a
corollary-how it stops matters.
Timely and early action can tame the magnitude of fiscal deficits by
intercepting the growth of government interest costs before they crowd
out public fiscal flexibility and private markets. In the United States,
long-term budget models show that the failure to curb fiscal deficits over
the next several decades will enable interest costs to become the largest
"program" in the budget, exceeding health care and social security.8
Politically, timely action on fiscal problems yields significant dividends
in providing the members of the public time to make adjustments to
their own retirement and savings plans and their expectations about the
role of government in their lives. If nations wait until a market crisis
forces their hands, their economies and citizens will pay a steep price.
As we have seen recently in nations like Greece, bond markets can
suddenly force nations to make delayed reforms in major entitlements
and tax policies during the trough of a painful recession. 9 While
shedding, ill-timed fiscal
promising
eventual economic load
consolidations have the potential to be self-defeating, prompting a
vicious cycle of continued economic decline and short-term fiscal erosion.
Other nations have undergone either outright defaults or serious
flirtations with insolvency for which they paid a long-term economic and
political price. According to one estimate, more than ninety nations have
in fact defaulted on their debt over the past two centuries. 10 Many other
nations at the financial brink managed to avoid default, but nonetheless
experienced economic shocks and policy upheavals that caused rapid
erosion of economic wealth and incomes.
The effects of such a shock are wide-ranging. Currencies will
experience rapid depreciation, ushering in spikes in inflation and
interest rates. As the pressure to meet fiscal commitments increases,
some governments might resort to printing more money to lessen the

6. Paul Krugman, This Can't Go On, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2003, http://www.nytimes.
com/2003/l1/04/opinion/this-can-t-go-on.html.
7. HERBERT STEIN, WHAT I THINK: ESSAYS ON ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND LIFE 32

(1998).
8. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. No. 4933, THE 2014 LONG TERM FEDERAL BUDGET
OUTLOOK 3 (2014).

9. Zsolt Darvas & Olga Tschekassin, Poor and Under Pressure: The Social Impact of
Europe's Fiscal Consolidation,4 BRUEGEL POL'Y CONTRIBUTION 2, 7 (2015).
10. Anne Krueger, Op-Ed., Deberian poder declararse en quiebra los paises como
Argentina?,EL PAiS, Jan. 18, 2002, at 16.

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 22:2

debt burden, creating massive inflation. In either case, economic growth
would collapse and the standard of living would decline.11
Implementing the fiscal cure-spending cuts and tax increases-in
the throes of a crisis would cause painful adjustments as well, at least
in the near term. Much-delayed changes have to be implemented
abruptly with little deliberation or debate. Major changes to
entitlements and tax benefits that have become ingrained have to occur
almost overnight, as national leaders strain mightily to regain the
12
confidence of credit markets and other investors throughout the world.
Eventually, such actions would probably restore economic growth,
tame inflation, and cut interest rates, but not after taking incomes and
benefits below levels that most of us have come to expect. Early action
on fiscal pressures could have mitigated extreme cuts and enabled
adjustments to be phased in over many years, but an economic and
13
financial crisis no longer affords this luxury.
Ultimately, nations undertaking major fiscal cures in the throes of
an economic crisis can usher in political instability. Since consolidations
can exacerbate both deficits and downturns, they can be expected to give
rise to public resistance and political unrest. The legitimacy of deep cuts
is particularly vulnerable to reversal when governments introduce cuts
with little advance public education or when the public perceives
consolidation to be externally imposed.
Indeed, of the fourteen European crisis-hit nations that had
elections from 2009 to 2012, nine of them deposed the sitting
government. The foregoing shows that the governments' defeat came
4
during a time of high unemployment coupled with austerity measures. '
Spain (unemployment rate in 2012: 23 percent)
Mariano Rajoy's conservatives defeated the Socialist
government in November 2011, marking their first
electoral victory since 2000.

11. See Leonard E. Burman et al., CatastrophicBudget Failure, 63 NAT'L TAX J. 561,
575-79 (2010) (describing the macroeconomic effects of debt crises).
12. PAUL L. POSNER, WILL IT TAKE A CRISIS? 13 (The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2011).
13. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 8, at 14 ("Several years ago, when federal
debt was below 40 percent of GDP, the government had some flexibility to respond to the
financial crisis and severe recession by increasing spending and cutting taxes to stimulate
economic activity, providing public funding to stabilize the financial sector, and continuing
to pay for other programs even as tax revenues dropped sharply because of the decline in
output and income.").
14. See Anthony Faiola, French, Greek Voters Deal Blow to Austerity, WASH. POST, May
7, 2012, at A01.
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Greece (unemployment rate in 2012: 20.6 percent)
Socialist leader George Papendreou resigned in
November 2011 and was replaced by Independent Lucas
Papedmos, who was charged with bringing various
factions together in response to the crisis.
Portugal (unemployment rate in 2012: 12.6 percent)
The center-left Socialist government, led by Jose
Socrates, was voted out of power in June 2011 and
replaced by Anibal Cavaco Silva from the Social
Democratic Party.
Ireland (unemployment rate in 2012: 14.2 percent)
Prime Minister Brian Cowen resigned just weeks prior
to the February 2011 election, and his center-right
Party, Fianna Fiil, was overtaken by Enda Kenny,
leader of the centrist Party Fine Gael.
France (unemployment rate in 2012: 10 percent)
Socialist
Frangois
Hollande
narrowly
defeated
conservative Nicolas Sarkozy in May 2012 to give the
Socialists their first electoral victory since 1997.
Italy (unemployment rate in 2012: 9.2 percent) In
November 2011, Silvio Berlusconi, of the center-right
coalition "The People of Freedom," resigned. In April
2013, Independent Giorgio Napolitano was elected with
a comfortable margin of victory.
United Kingdom (unemployment rate in 2012: 7.8
percent) In May 2010, Conservative Party leader David
Cameron defeated Labor's Gordon Brown in a coalition
with the Liberal party, marking the first electoral
victory for the Conservatives since 1992.
Denmark (unemployment rate in 2012: 7.6 percent) In
September 2011, the center-left coalition, led by Helle
Thorning-Schmidt, narrowly defeated the center-right
coalition.
Finland (unemployment rate in 2012: 7.9 percent) In
April 2011, the Center Party, which had previously won
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two consecutive elections, was defeated and replaced by
the National Coalition Party.
III. EROSION OF FAITH IN THE POLITICAL EFFICACY OF DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS

A. DemocraticElections as a Disincentive for FiscalForesight
Notwithstanding the overwhelming advantages of early action on
fiscal challenges, many observers have concluded that democratic
systems and leaders are incapable of acting with foresight on fiscal
problems. Many of the most sophisticated commentators think it will
take a crisis for nations to collectively face the hard choices needed to be
made on the spending and tax sides of the budget. In this view, foresight
is a politically unnatural act for elected officials who focus more on their
next election than on the fiscal prospects facing the nation twenty years
from now. Drazen and Easterly conclude that the hypothesis that a
crisis is necessary to induce significant reform has become the new
orthodoxy.1 5 In the United States, some of our leading fiscal observers
have voiced this dour outlook. Leonard Burman, a leading public
finance scholar and public official has concluded:
The basic problem is that policymakers want to make
people happy, which means more spending and lower
taxes. As long as interest rates stay low and the public
does not express a strong aversion to deficits, there is
little cost to political pandering. Politicians face the
same kind of incentive for short-term actions that may
be detrimental over the long-term as corporate
executives do. Corporate CEOs are rewarded financially
for boosting short-term profits, even if they harm the
company over the long-term. Political leaders perceive
that their reelection depends on short-term results, even
if the short-term expedients may be disastrous over the
long-term.16

The perceived conflict between the electoral imperative bearing
down on public officials and the fiscal responsibility imperative is not

15. Allan Drazen & William Easterly, Do Crises Induce Reform? Simple Empirical
Tests of Conventional Wisdom, 13 ECON. & POL. 129, 153-56 (2001) (describing evidence
supporting the "strong version of the crisis-induces-reform hypothesis").
16. Burman et al., supra note 11, at 566.
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only quite prevalent among policy leaders, but it has deep academic
roots. Public-choice theorists have contributed their own theoretical
justification. The behavioral assumption behind this view is that public
officials are motivated by self-interest to pursue private gain at the
expense of the public interest. Buchanan attempts to demonstrate how
bureaucrats and politicians alike will force government budgets to be
17
higher than they should be to increase their own "political incomes."
Agents use their superior information as well as their superior political
organization and intensity over principals (i.e., the electorate) to push
up spending and perpetuate a larger public sector. Government is a
18
monopolist and not a neutral responder to demands from the public.
Buchanan and Tullock argue that politicians are incapable of fixing the
deficit. Elections make them shortsighted and irresponsible, and only a
major crisis or constitutional amendment will force fiscally responsible
actions. 19

Beyond public-choice theory, other political scientists have long
observed that the common pool problem creates asymmetry between
those benefitting from narrow benefits and those paying the costs. As
James Wilson notes, "clientele" politics promote the expansion of
government benefits because those enjoying concentrated benefits have
a greater incentive to mobilize than the broad publics paying for these
programs. But efforts to unwind these programs are undermined by
"entrepreneurial politics" where those bearing the concentrated costs of
cutbacks have greater incentive to voice their concerns than do broad
publics who stand to realize diffuse gains. 20 Many conclude that this
incentive structure fosters deficits and curbs efforts to balance budgets
21
because of the bias toward higher spending implied in this asymmetry.
This asymmetry of interests is reflected in an asymmetry in
mobilization. The most intense interests with the greatest incentives to
mobilize are the narrow groups benefitting from higher spending or
17. See James M. Buchanan,

Why Does Government Grow?, in BUDGETS AND

BUREAUCRATS: THE SOURCES OF GOVERNMENT GROWTH 3, 13 (Thomas E. Borcherding ed.,

1977).
18. See William C. Mitchell, Fiscal Behavior of the Modern Democratic State: Public
Choice Perspectives and Contributions, in PUBLIC POLICY THEORIES, MODELS, AND
CONCEPTS 125, 129 (Daniel C. McCool ed., 1995).
19. See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT, LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962) (using economic

theory to study democratic decisionmaking from the perspective of the individual).
20. See James Q. Wilson, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357, 358-68 (James Q. Wilson
ed., 1980).
21. See, e.g., Xavier Debrun, DemocraticAccountability, Deficit Bias and Independent
Fiscal Agencies (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper 11/173, 2011) (illustrating features
of independent fiscal agencies and their need to incorporate the political nature of fiscal
policy).

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES

22:2

lower revenues, not the broader public who has to finance the costs in
one way or the other.
The bias against early action on deficits is reinforced by the steep
discount rates that political leaders are said to adopt. Political leaders
are shortsighted and have even less incentive to promote sacrifice
among current taxpayers for the benefit of future taxpayers or public
officials. The election cycles are often two to four years in most
democracies, reinforcing the short-term bias of elected officials.
B. The PurportedRole of Economic Crises in ReestablishingFiscally
Responsible Government
From these perspectives, a crisis appears to be the only way that the
discounting problem and the asymmetries between narrow and broad
interests can be addressed. First, a crisis overcomes the discounting
problem by transforming the problem into one that affects current
taxpayers. While current stakeholders may lose specific benefits from
deficit reduction, they also realize immediate gains through the rescue
of the broader economy, the crisis of which has made rescue a
compelling and immediate concern. A crisis rebalances the intensity
between narrow beneficiaries and broader taxpayers by making the
diffuse costs of current policies more salient and visible to broader
publics. It also makes the projected benefits from spending cuts and tax
increases more compelling as well. Accordingly, a crisis succeeds in
reversing the mobilization bias from the narrow beneficiaries of
government programs to the broader publics.
It is important to define what this article means by a crisis. Given
the absence of any commonly accepted threshold beyond which a
problem merits categorization as a crisis, it may be said-as "social
constructionists" stress-that any crisis is to some extent a creation of
the language used to depict it. The definition and response to a crisis
involves a contest between competing frames regarding severity, causes,
22
responsibility, and implications.
Nonetheless, for purposes of this article, the author defines a crisis
as an exogenous event or "shock" bearing down on all actors of the
system that requires some kind of policy response. In its pure form, a
fiscal crisis would consist of a market-induced shock where credit
markets react by actions that cause immediate harm to the economy
and to the prospects of financing government debt. This narrower
definition helps control for endogeneity where political leaders already

22. Daniel Nohrstedt & Christopher M. Weible, The Logic of Policy Change after Crisis:
HAZARDS & CRISIS PUB. POL'Y 1, 6 (2010).

Proximity and Subsystem Interaction, 1 RISKS,
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committed to proactive fiscal policy contrive crises to mobilize support
for their pre-existing positions. For instance, in the United States,
policymakers brought about a series of "fiscal cliffs" that required
leaders to make spending cuts and tax increases to avoid a series of
across-the-board cuts and tax increases. In January of 2013, leaders
instituted tax increases on the wealthy to avoid across-the-board tax
increases on the mass populace. Later during the same year, the
leaders' failure to enact spending cuts precipitated a series of extensive
across-the-board cuts and resulted in a government shutdown for
sixteen days-in effect, the government "jumped off' the fiscal cliff.
These kinds of crises would not fall under the more rigorous definition
of crises used in the remainder of this article.
IV. ACHIEVING THE POLITICALLY IMPROBABLE: A FIVE-NATION STUDY

Notwithstanding the reigning pessimism about democracies and
deficits, many advanced nations have in fact undertaken significant
fiscal consolidations in recent years. One OECD study found that from
1978 through 2007, there were eighty-five fiscal consolidation episodes
in twenty-four OECD nations that improved the cyclically adjusted
fiscal balance. Most of these consolidation episodes were of short
duration and led to only modest gains in fiscal balances. As shown in
Figures 2 and 3 below, however, several episodes lasted over longer
23
periods and achieved considerably greater fiscal consolidation.

23. St~phanie Guichard et al., What Promotes Fiscal Consolidation: OECD Country
Experiences 8 (Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Econ. Dep't, Working Paper No. 553,
2007), availableat http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/180833424370.
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Figure 2: Frequency and size of fiscal consolidations (1978-2007)
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Source: Stephanie Guichard et al., What PromotesFiscal Consolidation:OECD Country
Experiences 8 (Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Econ. Dep't, Working Paper No. 553,
2007), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/180833424370.

Figure 3: Frequency and duration of fiscal consolidations (19782007)
Number of episodes
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Source: Stephanie Guichard et al., What Promotes Fiscal Consolidation:OECD Country
Experiences 8 (Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Econ. Dep't, Working Paper No. 553,
2007), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/180833424370.
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A separate OECD study examined the incidence and evolution of
large fiscal consolidation episodes. 24 It found thirteen cases of deficit
reduction between 1980 and 2000 where deficits were reduced from 8 to
1 percent of GDP within five years.
Economist Henry Aaron notes that many advanced nations have
achieved even more significant swings in the primary balance in the
years before the 2008 financial crisis. The following table illustrates
that many nations, including the United States, have achieved
25
significant and sustained reductions of deficits and debt.
Table 3: Fiscal swings for major consolidations in the OECD
Nation
Australia
Canada
Finland
New Zealand
Sweden
United Kingdom
United States

Period
1992-1999
1992-2000
1992-2000
2000-2006
1993-2000
1993-2000
1992-2000

Fiscal Swing as
Percent of GDP
7.5
11.1
12.3
5.9
14.9
11.7
7.4

Source: Henry J. Aaron, How to Think About the U.S. Budget Challenge, 29 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 883, 889 (2010).

The question posed for OECD nations is how to learn from these
past episodes and help budget officials cope with wrenching fiscal
choices today. Research is just beginning to be published on the
experience of nations with austerity in the wake of the 2008 financial
crisis. 26 The challenges of and responses to the recent financial crisis are
critical to understanding the prospects of democratic nations.
Nevertheless, an examination of how nations addressed such fiscal
challenges in previous episodes can be revealing because we have had a
longer period to observe national policy responses. Were the nations
from the past able to definitively face structural deficits and resolve
them in ways that were both economically and politically sustainable?
Were the fiscal actions taken done under the pressure of an exogenous
crisis or were other factors primarily responsible for pushing fiscal
24. Hansjorg Blchliger et al., Fiscal Consolidation: Part 4. Case Studies of Large
Fiscal ConsolidationEpisodes (Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Econ. Dep't, Working
Paper No. 935, 2012), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k9fdf5xptlq-en.
25. See Henry J. Aaron, How to Think About the U.S. Budget Challenge, 29 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 883, 889 (2010) (showing reduction in fiscal gap for selected nations
during various periods).
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consolidation onto the policy agenda? Were the economies of those
nations made better off not only in the short-term, but also in the longer
term? As political leaders of today face seemingly no-win choices
between austerity and growth, how did political officials fare with the
voters when they implemented previous consolidations?
A. Analytical Approach
This article reviews the vast literature on fiscal consolidation to
assess the extant research on these questions. In addition, it reviews the
experiences of a set of nations that achieved significant consolidation
and sustained surpluses for more than six years consecutively before the
financial crisis, as shown in Table 4.
Table 4: OECD surplus nations 2000-2008
Nation
Australia
Canada
Denmark
Finland
Korea
Luxembourg
New Zealand
Norway
Sweden

Years in Surplus
9
6
8
9
9
8
9
9
7

Source: Paul Posner & Matthew Sommerfeld, The Politics of FiscalAusterity: Democracies
and Hard Choices 12 (Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Governance and Territorial
Dev. Directorate 2012), availableat http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplay
documentpdf/?cote=GOV/PGC/SBO%282012%294&doclanguage=en.

The author examined the experiences of four of these nations in
depth: Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Sweden. These nations'
consolidations were perhaps the deepest and among the most longlasting consolidations of the OECD members. In addition, the United
States was added since it sustained consolidation for ten years in the

26. See, e.g., Walter Kickert, Tiina Randma-Liiv & Riin Savi, The Politics of Fiscal
Consolidation in Europe: A Comparative Analysis (June 14, 2014), available at
http://www.cocops.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/1O/WP7-trend-report-final.pdfops.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2013/1OiWP7-trend-report final.pdf.
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1990s, ultimately running surpluses for four of those years. 27 The
United States illustrates the experience of a presidential separation of
powers system compared to the other parliamentary systems.
For each of these five nations, the author drew on interviews and
secondary documents to show how the following issues affected the
initiation, intensity, and political sustainability of consolidations:
trigger for consolidation, economic context, political competition among
the parties, the timing of consolidation in the electoral cycle, the
composition of consolidation initiatives, the strategies pursued to
achieve shared sacrifice, and the impact of consolidation on debt and
GDP. Spreadsheets showing how the nations were arrayed for each of
these dimensions are attached as Appendix I to this article. The
following sections discuss the findings on each of these variables based
both on a synthesis of the literature and on the five case studies.
B. Impetus
Fiscal consolidation involves the allocation of sacrifice across
contending groups and interests within each nation. Accordingly, it is
not surprising that many nations require a compelling trigger to bring
about deficit reduction. As a general rule, governments undertake fiscal
consolidation only when public finances are weak, as measured by rising
deficits and debt levels. 28 In fact, some studies suggest that the gravity
of the initial fiscal conditions influences nations to undertake deeper
and more prolonged consolidations, which have a greater chance of
29
stabilizing debt in the future.
Large consolidations constitute a form of punctuated equilibrium
where the existing policy frameworks undergo transformations that
amount to a policy and political earthquake. Median improvement for
large consolidations entails improvement of fiscal balance by 7 percent
of GDP within five years.3 0 Alesina and colleagues suggest that a crisis

27. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2015 TO 2025, at 4

(2015), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments49892Outlook2015.pdf.
28. Margit Molnar, Fiscal ConsolidationPart 5. What Factors Determine the Success of
ConsolidationEfforts? 8-9 (Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Econ. Dep't, Working
Paper No. 936, 2012).
29. See Martin Larch & Alessandro Turrini, Received Wisdom and Beyond: Lessons
from Fiscal Consolidations in the EU, in EUROPEAN COMMISSION ECONOMIC PAPERS 320,
at 16 (2008); Roberto Perotti, Fiscal Policy in Good Times and Bad, 111 Q. J. ECON. 1399,
1424-31 (1999).
30. B15chliger et al., supranote 24, at 6.
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is needed to break a political deadlock or "war of attrition" between
31
opposing parties and interests.
Table 5: Fiscal consolidation triggers for case study nations (1 =
most important; 3 = least important)
Triggers
Country.
Canada (1993-97)
Australia (1994-98)
Sweden (1994-97)
United States (1990-98)
New Zealand (1984-93)

Market Crisis

Economic Pressures

Political Blame Avoidance

2
3
1
3
1

1
2
2
2
2

3
1
3
1
3

Source: Paul Posner & Matthew Sommerfeld, The Politics of FiscalAusterity: Implications
for the United States, 32 PUB. BUDGETING AND FIN. 32, 37 (2012) (table depicts authors'
judgment based on case studies).

The experiences recorded in Table 5 illustrate that external
economic crises indeed constituted the formative trigger for
consolidation in Sweden and New Zealand. Sweden faced economic
pressures that triggered a recession and banking crisis in the early
1990s. Economic growth was negative from 1991 to 1993, and registered
unemployment increased dramatically from about 2 percent in 1990 to
over 8 percent in 1993. The economic slowdown and banking bailout had
dramatic fiscal effects that led to a sharp increase in budget deficits,
which peaked at over 12 percent of GDP in 1993.32
During 1994 and early 1995, Canada's fiscal outlook deteriorated
quickly, although it did not reach the dire straits that Sweden
experienced. The situation worsened due to a sharp rise in interest rates
arising partly from concerns in the international investment community
about Canada's large debt burden. Following the economic crisis
experienced by Mexico, investors shifted some of their assets out of
Canada, pushing up interest rates, lowering the value of the Canadian
dollar. This asset shift further pushed up Canadian interest rates,
pushed down the Canadian dollar, and prompted Moody's to put the
nation on a credit watch. With general government debt approaching
33
100 percent of GDP, foreign investors demanded higher interest rates.
31. See Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, Fiscal Expansions and Fiscal Adjustments
in OECD Countries21 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5214, 1995).
32. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/AIMD-00-23, BUDGET SURPLUSES:
EXPERIENCES OF OTHER NATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 176 (1999).
33. Canada Government Debt to GDP 1988-2015, TRADING ECON., http://www.
tradingeconomics.com/canada/government-debt-to-gdp (last visited June 10, 2015).
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Of course, deficits and debt do not cause a crisis by themselvespolitical actors do by using economic statistics to frame policy debates.
Thus, in Canada, as the economy worsened, the crisis reached a boiling
point when the nation's pride was wounded by a Wall Street Journal
editorial likening the nation to a banana republic.
In some cases, however, even relatively modest fiscal imbalances
can lead to national alarm and fiscal consolidation. The labeling of these
imbalances as a "crisis" in nations illustrates how that overworked term
is often socially constructed. For instance, Australia redoubled its
efforts for consolidation after the recession of the early 1990s. By
international standards, fiscal imbalances were relatively modest, with
deficits peaking at 3.6 percent of GDP in 1992, and growth resuming in
1993. 3 4 Thus, a sharp trigger or crisis did not prompt renewed action in
Australia. Rather, it was broader economic concerns that the deficits
symbolized that troubled elites. This included the shadow cast by the
original economic and fiscal crisis of the mid-1980s and the reliance of
the Australian economy on foreign sources of capital to finance private
investment. In the post-financial-crisis era, the fiscal anxiety continues,
as the Labor government uses crisis metaphors to justify a return to
surpluses. In nations like Australia, budget surpluses have come to
serve as a symbolic metaphor for the competence of the governmentthe single most important "acid test" of a government's economic
35
credentials.
In the United States, serious consolidation began in 1990 and lasted
through 2001. High interest rates alarmed both the central bank and
the business community, but there was certainly no market crisis
bearing down on the nation. Lacking a compelling market crisis, federal
officials developed fiscal rules under the Gramm Rudman Hollings
budget regime in the 1980s, which threatened to impose across-theboard budget cuts of $100 billion in 1990.36 Even without a crisis, the
perceived political threat posed to President George H.W. Bush from the
specter of these cuts and a slowing economy were sufficient to prompt
37
him to renege on his campaign pledge to avoid new taxes.
34. John Wilkinson, Australian Federal and State Budgets-An Overview 6 (N.S.W.
Parliamentary Library Research Serv., Briefing Paper No. 2/10, 2010).
35. Lewis Hawke & John Wanna, Australia After Budgetary Reform: A Lapsed Pioneer
or DecorativeArchitect?, in THE REALITY OF BUDGETARY REFORM IN OECD NATIONS 65, 81

(John Wanna et al. eds., 2010).
36. See Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99
Stat. 1037, 1039, 1043-44 (1985) (directing that the congressionally-mandated maximum
deficit amount not be exceeded).
37. See CTRS. ON THE PUB. SERV., GEORGE MASON UNIV., LOOKING BACK TO MOVE

FORWARD: THE 1990 BUDGET SUMMIT REVISITED 7 (2013) ("Hoping to forge an agreement
before sequestration, President Bush began meeting with top congressional leaders in
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Progress toward fiscal consolidation is iterative and nonlinear. Four
of the five nations among our case studies had undertaken
consolidations in earlier decades. Australia and New Zealand realized
substantial fiscal reforms in this earlier period before deep recessions
undermined their gains. 38 Sweden and Canada also experienced
consolidations in this earlier decade, which were not as successful as
their 1990s initiatives. 39 This history suggests that fiscal consolidations
are path dependent and build on the previous experiences of nations,
both good and bad.
Some nations like Canada learned lessons from the failure to
sustain fiscal progress in the prior decade that they applied to their
more successful 1990s initiative. As overoptimistic assumptions eroded
the 1980s deficit reduction, for instance, the new Liberal government in
1994 was determined to use deliberately cautious, "prudent" economic
assumptions. In Sweden, the government learned that to sustain its
gains, it must adopt a three-year spending cap and a policy goal of
sustaining surpluses when economic growth is expanding.
V.

AUSTERITY AND

ECONOMIC GROWTH

Considerable debate rages today about the alleged tension between
fiscal austerity and growth. Certainly, macroeconomic theory explains
that economic downturns may be exacerbated and prolonged if major
austerity is introduced at the low point of recessions. Some European
nations appear to validate that theory today. Indeed, several studies
find that consolidation is generally initiated when economic troubles
descend. One study finds that the likelihood of fiscal consolidation
increases with the rate of unemployment. 40 Another finds that more
41
successful consolidations began with weak economic activity.
Simply put, the politics and economics of fiscal austerity may indeed
clash, with nations doomed to undertake pro-cyclical fiscal policy during
the troughs of the business cycle. In the short-term, it may very well be
easier for leaders to gain support for consolidation when the economy
appears to be flat-lined and even in crisis.

May 1990. Little progress was made until late June when President Bush and House
Speaker Foley agreed to put tax increases and entitlement reforms on the table.").
38. See U.S. GOV'T AccouNTABIIuTY OFFICE, GAO/AIMD-95-30, DEFICIT REDUCTION:
EXPERIENCES OF OTHER NATIONS 72 (1994); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra

note 32, at 130.
39. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 32, at 23.
40. Larch & Turrini, supra note 29, at 11.
41. See Guichard et al., supra note 23, at 15.
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Fortunately, the relationship between austerity and growth is not so
simple. Even the most shortsighted leader might realize that
undertaking austerity in the depths of recessions is not only the wrong
economic medicine, but is also bad politics. As many European nations
are finding today, cuts only accentuate short-term economic woes and
42
hasten the firing of national leaders in the process.
Some studies are more sanguine about the economic timing of
consolidation. One study finds that governments are more likely to
undertake consolidations in good economic periods. 43 Another study
44
finds that the fallout from economic crises might hinder retrenchment.
A study of the largest consolidation also finds that growth rates picked
up before fiscal tightening began, 45 as shown in Figure 4 excerpted from
that study. The figure shows that economic growth rates started to
climb from their lowest point-Year 0-a year before the initiation of
fiscal consolidation programs.

42. Alesina has long noted that fiscal austerity is in fact compatible with economic
restoration as long as it is done on the spending side. Expansionary contractions can occur
when cuts are perceived as permanent and change their savings behavior and their
expectations of interest rates. Alberto Alesina & Silvia Ardagna, Tales of Fiscal
Adjustments, 13 ECON. POL'Y 489, 491-98 (1998).
43. See Juargen von Hagen & Rolf R. Strauch, Fiscal Consolidations:Quality, Economic
Conditions, and Success, 109 PUB. CHOICE 327, 343 (2001).
44. See Salvador Barrios et al., EU Fiscal ConsolidationAfter the FinancialCrisis, in
EUROPEAN COMMISSION ECONOMIC PAPERS 418, at 9-11 (2010).
45. B15chliger et al., supra note 24, at 12.
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Figure 4: Economic growth rates and consolidation
(consolidation begins in year 0)
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Source: Hansjorg Blchliger et al., Fiscal Consolidation:Part 4. Case Studies of Large
Fiscal ConsolidationEpisodes 12 (Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Econ. Dep't,
Working Paper No. 935, 2012), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k9fdf5xptlq-en.

This finding contradicts the economic crisis hypothesis by suggesting
that nations wait until economies start to recover to initiate austerity
measures.
Whether by forethought or fortuitous accident, leaders in some
nations seem to have the uncanny ability to initiate austerity during
what this article will call a "goldilocks economy"-an economy that is
not too good, but not too bad. In these times, deficit reduction can boost
growth, partly by convincing central banks and markets to lower
46
interest rates.
Among our case-study nations, Sweden undertook significant deficit
reduction in 1994 just as its economy was beginning to restore growth
from its recession lows. Well-timed fiscal consolidation can aid a healing
economy by instilling confidence in global markets and central banks;

46. Von Hagen & Strauch, supra note 43, at 333-336.
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indeed, the interest rates on the ten-year government bond dropped
from 10 percent to 5 percent between 1994 and 1998. 4 7 For the OECD as
a whole, half of the eighty-five consolidations from 1978 through 2007
were sustained long enough to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio for at
48
least two years.
Importantly, well-timed consolidations also offer political bonuses.
Governments undertaking painful cuts and tax increases can point to
tangible progress in economic growth to justify the programmatic and
fiscal sacrifices. President Bill Clinton was able to do this in the
aftermath of passing the 1993 deficit reduction legislation, as a growing
economy gained new momentum on the way to a growth boom that
lifted all fiscal boats. 49 His predecessor, President George H.W. Bush
was not so lucky. He was fated to begin the U.S. consolidation in 1990
during a worsening economy and never really was able to point to
progress in the remaining two years of his term. In fact,
notwithstanding substantial cuts and tax increases, deficits worsened in
the first several years due to weaker than expected growth, depriving
him of the ability to brag about the fiscal progress he helped institute.
He lost the election of 1992 to Mr. Clinton, enabling Clinton to claim
50
credit for the progress that was kicked off during Bush's tenure.
While waiting for economic growth to resume before undertaking
consolidation might be appropriate for some nations, many do not have
this luxury. Nations that must finance their debt may ultimately be
priced out of the market if they fail to generate confidence in their
economic and fiscal management. Moreover, waiting too long may
undercut the sense of urgency that is often critical to inspire support for
fiscal sacrifice.
Indeed, Schick argues that in a financial crisis, fiscal policy may
need to follow a different compass than that prescribed by the textbooks.
In normal recessions, governments should run a deficit by stimulating
demand. In this Great Recession, however, it is critical for each
government to promote confidence using its markets. This means that
bond and credit markets become more critical to sustainable financing
for government. And this means that austerity will have to take a front,
not a back, seat.5 1 Thus, competitive capital markets may serve to place

47. See ANDREW LILICO ET AL., CONTROLLING SPENDING AND GOVERNMENT DEFICITS 9
(2009).
48. See Guichard et al., supranote 23, at 10.
49. See IWAN MORGAN, THE AGE OF DEFICITS: PRESIDENTS AND UNBALANCED BUDGETS
FROM JIMMY CARTER TO GEORGE W. BUSH 175 (2009).
50. See id. at 149-157.
51. ALLEN SCHICK, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION
WILL THE CRISIS CHANGE BUDGETING? 9-10 (2012).
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a limit on the ability of many nations to sustain expansionary fiscal
policies during periods of recession.
Several of the five case study nations felt compelled to attack
deficits during the depths of recessions. In New Zealand in 1984, an
impending economic crisis marked by heavy capital outflows
precipitated large exchange rate devaluation, a credit downgrade, high
inflation, and high debt. In response, the government implemented a
series of sweeping economic reforms to reduce the role of government in
the economy and win back the confidence of global markets. This
included reducing a deficit of 6.5 percent of GDP by increasing taxes
and cutting expenditures. Given the depth of the recession,
unemployment grew and it took nearly seven years of reform just to
raise GDP 2.8 percent higher than it was at the outset of the crisis. 52
Nations undertaking sustained consolidations reaped significant
economic benefits over time. All five of our nations realized major
improvements in interest rates, economic growth, and decreased public
debt. Sustained surpluses enabled these nations to survive the Great
Recession with far greater resilience, with less crippling deficits and
debt than others. As shown in Figure 5, the surplus group of nations
lapsed into deficits averaging 2.8 percent of GDP by 2010, compared
with 4.8 percent for OECD as a whole and 9.2 percent for the nations
with chronic deficits during the past ten years.

52. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 38, at 130-39.
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Figure 5: Deficit/surplus as a percentage of GDP (2000-2010)
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Source: Paul Posner & Matthew Sommerfeld, The Politics of FiscalAusterity: Democracies
and Hard Choices 18 (Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Governance and Territorial
Dev. Directorate 2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplay
documentpdfJ?cote=GOV/PGC/SBO%282012%294&doclanguage=en.

VI. THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
Political institutions are critical in determining whether and how
fiscal consolidations will be shaped to respond to economic and fiscal
triggers. Given the high stakes involved, a government must have
sufficient political support to form an alliance with key groups and
publics to push for needed reforms and retrenchment.
Among the political variables associated with consolidation, two
stand out: the timing of consolidation and the relative strength of the
ruling party. With regard to timing, there is strong evidence that
governments are most successful when consolidations are introduced in
the immediate aftermath of an election. New governments have high

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES

22:2

standing with publics and are relatively untarnished by the slings and
53
arrows of governing.
This effect is amplified when the incoming government campaigned
on fiscal consolidation issues. In these cases, the party can claim a
mandate to impose consolidation from the campaign itself. Successful
consolidations are not introduced by stealth but rather with broad
publicity to capitalize on momentum drawn from the election. Fully
transparent and compelling public rationales are the touchstone for the
legitimacy of consolidations, and governments that fail to capitalize on
positive public sentiment lose the political high ground of legitimacy
that is so desperately prized in such a high stakes political contest.
Among our five case studies, the newly elected governments of
Sweden and Canada both ran on the need for consolidation, enabling
them to claim a mandate for strong action. On the other hand, in the
United States, President George H.W. Bush stressed tax cuts rather
than consolidation in the 1988 election.5 4 This complicated and
undermined his ability to promote his deficit reduction agreement with
Congress that included tax increases, particularly within his own
Republican party, which never forgave him for abandoning what was
perceived as a central pledge in return for giving him the party's
nomination.
The research here suggests that, as important as political variables
are, research is often divided about their influence on fiscal
consolidation. 55 For instance, the findings are conflicted with regard to
the impact of strong ruling parties on the prospects for fiscal
consolidation. Some studies find that single-party governments are
more effective in forging agreements than coalitions; strong majorities
are associated with more decisive actions and more dramatic "cold
showers." 56 Strong parliamentary majorities are more likely to fashion
lasting fiscal corrections and more fundamental reforms of major
spending policies. Alesina finds that fiscal stabilization is facilitated by
presidential systems with unified parties controlling the legislative
57
branch.
However, other research suggests that strong single-party
governments do not have statistically significant effects on deficit

53. See Guichard et al., supra note 23, at 21.
54. See MORGAN, supranote 49, at 124.
55. See Kickert et al., supra note 26, at 19.
56. See Larch & Turrini, supra note 29, at 15.
57. Alberto Alesina, Silvia Ardagna & Francesco Trebbi, Who Adjusts and When? On
the Political Economy of Reforms 2-3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 12049, 2006).
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reduction. 58 Countries with minority governments and coalition
governments do as well as single-party majorities. One leading scholar
even suggests that single-party majorities in parliamentary systems
may be less likely to take on difficult policy choices than coalition or
minority governments because of the singular concentration of blame on
that one party. By contrast, divided governments facilitate hard choices
by spreading blame to all parties and interests, assuming they can
reach an agreement among themselves-a heroic proposition in some
systems. 59
Similar disagreements have broken out over the relative efficacy of
presidential versus parliamentary governments in dealing with fiscal
sacrifice and other hard choices. On the one hand, presidential systems
may be at a disadvantage. Because the president and the legislature are
institutionally and electorally independent, the president faces a more
independent legislature, even under unified government when the same
party controls both institutions. Strong parties can bridge the
institutional differences, but at the same time, they can make
agreement under divided government doubly difficult.
However, presidential systems have several advantages. When
coalitions govern, the coalition partners in parliament have greater
potential leverage because they can credibly threaten to remove the
government through a vote of no confidence-an option not available
under a presidential separation of powers system. Also, according to
Cheibub, presidents are under greater pressure from publics to achieve
deficit reduction than parliamentary leaders, owing to their greater
visibility and responsibility for fiscal outcomes. 60 In fact, Cheibub finds
that presidential systems do a better job of fiscal management and
61
budgetary control than parliamentary systems.
Interestingly, political orientation does not seem to matter. Molnar
suggests that centrist parties are most likely to reduce debt, but Alesina
and Perotti find that centrist governments are less likely to mount
successful consolidations. 62 In several of our case study nations, ruling
58. See Takayuki Sakamoto, Effects of Government Characteristicson FiscalDeficits in
18 OECD Countries, 1961-1994, 34 COMP. POL. STUD. 527, 542-43 (2001); Uwe Wagschal
& Georg Wenzelburger, The Pre-CrisisPerspective: When Do Governments Consolidate? 19
(Mar. 24, 2011) (unpublished paper), available at https://www.wipo.uni-freiburg.de/
dateien/tagungen/FiscalConsolidation20ll/fiscalsubmissionsfwagschal.
59. See PAUL PIERSON, DISMANTLING THE WELFARE STATE? REAGAN, THATCHER AND
THE POLITICS OF RETRENCHMENT 33-34 (1994).

60. See Josd Antonio Cheibub, Presidentialism, Electoral Identifiability, and Budget
Balances in DemocraticSystems, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 353, 365 (2006).
61. Id.
62. See Alesina & Perotti, supranote 31, at 21.
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parties were effective in preempting the positions of opposing parties. In
nations like Australia and New Zealand, left wing parties became
credible reformers when they championed reforms to pensions and other
programs supported by their base in the name of economic growth.
Whether pursued by left or right wing parties, such a strategy can be
very effective in disarming the opposition and capturing the broad
center of the political spectrum, albeit at some risk of alienating their
base. The presidency of George H.W. Bush illustrated this latter risk
when his support for tax increases in 1990 weakened support from
conservatives in the Republican Party. In turn, this jeopardized the
prospects of Congressional approval for deficit reduction and may have,
ultimately, led to his defeat in the 1992 elections.
In our five case studies, patterns of political party control spanned
the entire range of possible models for political support as indicated in
Table 6. Canada is the best pure example of a partisan model with a
single ruling party controlling government from 1993 through 2006.
Table 6: Partisan models for fiscal consolidation

Australia
Canada
New Zealand
Sweden
United States

Partisan

Cross-partisan

Copartisan

x
x

x

x

x

x
x

x
x

Source: Author's findings derived from alignment at the time that deficit reduction began
in each nation.

The other cases illustrated a cross-partisan coalition where several
parties joined in with a major party to govern. This was the case in
Sweden in 1994 when the Social Democratic Party, even while heading
a coalition, gained approval for major consolidation initiatives that not
only rapidly improved the fiscal balance but also succeeded in reforming
the nation's pension system. The United States veered from the 1990
consolidation under a cross-partisan coalition to a purely partisan
consolidation in 1993, then back to a cross-partisan coalition in 1997.63
Table 6 also suggests that several nations exhibited copartisanship,
meaning that both parties essentially took turns implementing fiscal
consolidation, notwithstanding some modest variations. In New
Zealand, the different party coalitions all pledged fealty to the same
63. See ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 24-27 (3d

ed. 2007).
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fiscal goal of reducing debt to a set percentage of GDP, albeit with
differing relative agendas and mixes of spending and revenues to
64
achieve these targets.
There are times when national leaders succeed in gaining genuine
bipartisan support for major reforms. This was particularly the case
with pension reforms. Given the political resistance to change in
programs and structural policies, governments had incentives to reach
out beyond their coalitions to form bipartisan or all-party commissions
and task forces, as shown in Table 7.65
Table 7: Multi-party vehicles in pension reform
Canada-reform of the Canada Pension Plan was adopted after
two-thirds of the provinces adopted the arrangement.
Spain-the 1996 Toledo Pact is an all-party agreement ratified
by unions and employer associations to reform the Spanish old
age security system.
Sweden-the 1998 reform of pensions was developed through an
all-party agreement resulting in a new system providing
incentives to prolong work and create notional private accounts.
Switzerland and New Zealand-both held referenda on major
pension reforms in 1995 and 1997.
Austria-1997 reform was a product of government bargaining
with unions.
United States-1983 reform was the product of a commission
with participation by leaders of both parties, which developed a
consensual social security reform including extension of
retirement age and increased payroll taxes.

64. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supranote 32, at 130-149.
65. John Myles & Paul Pierson, The ComparativePoliticalEconomy of PensionReform,
in THE NEW POLITICS OF THE WELFARE STATE 305, 322-23 (Paul Pierson ed., 2001).
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VII. THE NATURE AND COMPOSITION OF CUTS
A. Types of ConsolidationStrategies
The economic success and political sustainability of fiscal
consolidation is shaped by the kinds of consolidation strategies adopted.
On the economic front, considerable research has long supported the
conclusion that successful consolidations are expenditure based. 66 One
study found that expenditure cuts contribute 52 percent of successful
67
consolidations compared to only 12 percent for unsuccessful ones.
Spending consolidations are more likely to stabilize debt. Economists
generally agree that spending cuts have less immediate impact on
economic growth than tax increases. 68 Moreover, spending cuts,
particularly reforms to politically entrenched programs, may signal to
bond markets and savers alike the government's resolve to reduce
69
deficits and debt over the long term.
These general conclusions all depend on the timing and nature of
tax increases and spending cuts. Recent studies suggest that revenuebased consolidations can also be effective, particularly in low-tax
nations.70 Spain had revenue consolidations that were helpful. While
revenue increases may be particularly counterproductive in weak
economies, their impacts on stronger economies may be more salutary.
Revenue-based consolidations can also be effective if tax increases are
concentrated in more indirect taxes like consumption and excise taxes,
which have less growth-dampening effects than increased taxes on
71
income and investment.
Regardless of the economic efficiency implications, political concerns
prompted some nations to package tax increases with spending cuts. In
a nation like the United States, the failure to include both tax increases
and spending cuts would likely have doomed any chance of crosspartisan collaboration.
The specific types of spending cuts will also affect the economic
impact of consolidations. Transfers appear to be most associated with
success; however, wage cuts are also important. Structural reforms in
unemployment and labor protections also appear to have lasting effects

66. Alesina & Perotti, supra note 31, at 18.
67. Von Hagen & Strauch, supra note 43, at 330.
68. See Guichard et al., supra note 23, at 16.
69. See id. at 16 ("The longer an episode lasted the higher was the probability that it
would achieve success.").
70. See Larch & Turrini, supra note 29, at 22.
71. See George C. Tsibouris et al., Int'l Monetary Fund, Experience with Large Fiscal
Adjustment, Occasional Paper No. 246, at 10-12 (June 14, 2006).
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on consolidation. Cuts in investment, on the other hand, may reduce
growth and are often subject to reversal. For large consolidations, cuts
in investment were more significant than wages. Investment halved
72
during consolidation episodes.
For all consolidations, revenue increases counted for a larger faction
of total reductions. 73 Two-thirds of episodes had larger revenue
increases than spending. 74 But for the largest consolidations, revenues
contributed only a third. 75 One study suggests that the spending cut
factor has recently weakened, and a mix of revenue and spending have
become more important. This might be because earlier consolidations
already harvested the low-hanging fruit on spending. Further, the
highest spending nations may have converged to the median, removing
76
their incentive to dig deeper for spending cuts.
Beyond the mix of revenue and spending, the size and pace of
consolidations have economic and political implications as well.
Generally, incremental or decremental cuts and tax increases have been
viewed as most politically acceptable. 77 Tempering the magnitude of
cuts can also mitigate potential opposition. Kickert's latest research on
the cutbacks in Europe following the most recent financial crisis
suggests that most cutback decisions were moderate and iterative. The
sheer size of the fiscal gaps, however, required governments to
undertake an escalating series of cuts when initial incremental
78
decisions were not sufficient.
While engendering less political support, "cold shower" and large
consolidations appear to be more successful in resolving fiscal deficits
than gradual and more modest initiatives. Table 8 below shows that
most European nations undergoing consolidations undertake cold
showers rather than a gradual approach. Needless to say, those nations
engaging in cold shower consolidations are prompted by economic crisis
and strong political majorities.
The strength of cold shower initiatives is their promise of greater
economic and political returns more quickly. For one thing, it sends a
more definitive signal to markets about the seriousness of the proposed
consolidation. Cold showers may also be more comprehensive, opening
up opportunities to spread the pain across major programs and

72. Blchliger et al., supra note 24, at 10.
73. See Guichard et al., supra note 23, at 10.
74. Id.
75. Pete Devries et al., A New Action-Based Dataset of Fiscal Consolidation 82 (Int'l
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 11/128, 2011).
76. See Larch & Turrini, supra note 29, at 21.
77. See AARON B. WILDAVSKY, THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS 13 (1964).
78. See Kickert et al., supra note 26, at 20.
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constituencies-and possibly to engage in compensatory side payments
as will be discussed below. Large consolidations tend to use a broader
mix of spending and tax increases to achieve their daunting fiscal
targets.

79

The disadvantages are that cold showers must generate savings
immediately to achieve their bold fiscal goals. As a result, cold showers
tend to disproportionately cut programs like investments with more
immediate consequences for deficit reduction, regardless of their longerterm consequences for the economy. Moreover, cold showers make it
difficult to undertake reforms to sensitive pension and even health care
programs-reforms which ideally call for longer lead times and phase
ins to help clients adjust their life plans to new fiscal realities.8 0
Table 8: Cold shower consolidations vs. gradual consolidations
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(2008).

79. Molnar, supra note 28, at 22.
80. Larch & Turrini, supra note 29, at 15.

THE POLITICS OF FISCAL AUSTERITY

B. DissipatingPolitical Tensions Created by Consolidations
Leaders have to be mindful about the political tensions that
consolidation can bring when developing packages and priorities. While
spending cuts may have greater effects on credit market credibility,
they can also have disproportionate effects on inequality when
compared to tax increases. Leaders must cover their political risks by
pursuing strategies that spread the sacrifice and help obfuscate blame
for imposing painful decisions.
Our case study nations used a number of strategies to facilitate the
imposition of losses that have been observed to be common in advanced
political systems.81 These strategies included the following:
Apportioning sacrifice in an equitable manner
through strategies such as across-the-board cuts,
balancing spending, and revenue actions. Such
strategies help promote a perception of fairness.
They also intercept prisoners' dilemmas by
ensuring groups that their political competitors
who might dodge the deficit bullet will not
exploit their sacrifices. For instance, Sweden
imposed an 11 percent across-the-board cut on
nearly all programs and agencies at the outset of
their consolidation in 1994.82
"

Compensating losers with packages that cement
coalitions by providing gains to offset a portion of
the losses of major groups: One example of this
strategy is tax reform where reductions in tax
expenditures from eliminating breaks such as
mortgage interest deductions were partially
offset by dramatic cuts in tax rates in several of
our case study nations. In the United States,
major consolidations in 1990 and 1993 were
coupled with significant expansions of the
Earned Income Tax Credit for low-income
families and individuals and increased eligibility
for Medicaid health coverage for low-income
groups.8 3 In some nations the desire to

81. See generally PIERSON, supra note 59.
82. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 38, at 164.
83. See Sophie Feldman & Melissa Boteach, Timeline: Cutting Poverty and the Federal
Deficit Is

Possible, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS

(Aug. 15, 2012), https://www.american

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 22:2

compensate consolidation's losers can occur
sequentially as nations wait for surpluses to
provide tax cuts and new spending initiatives for
publics suffering from "consolidation fatigue."
While such initiatives ultimately dissipated
surpluses in the United States, other case study
nations like Canada, New Zealand, and
Australia were able to provide these benefits
without losing their surpluses.8 4
*

Phasing in cuts by making wedge shaped cuts
that grow over time: The political impacts of
spending cuts and tax increases can be
substantially blunted if they are introduced
slowly over a number of years to provide ample
time for transition and adaptation. For instance,
pension reforms often phase in increases in the
age requirement for full benefits over several
decades to provide time for those affected to
adjust their career and savings plans.

"

Promoting larger, more sweeping changes that
can yield more demonstrable fiscal progress:
Ironically, sweeping changes are positively
related to political success. Large packages not
only improve chances for dramatic gains in
economic outcomes, but also help promote
perceptions of fairness by spreading the pain
across more stakeholders. A former high
Swedish finance official writes that a broader
package of changes helps offset distributional
effects, particularly if both spending cuts and tax
increases are included.8 5 OECD research
suggests that large multiyear adjustments can

progress.org/issues/poverty/news/2012/08/15/1202 1/timeline-cutting-poverty-and-the-

federal-deficit-is-possible/.
84. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 38, at 74 ("[T]hese countries
have taken steps to use surpluses to address long-term national priorities, they have also
allowed for a portion of their surpluses to be used for more immediate needs.").
85. JENS HENRIKSSON, TEN LESSONS ABOUT BUDGET CONSOLIDATION 18-19 (Jean

Pisani-Ferry ed., 2007).
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make reforms possible that would not have been
86
able to find support on their own.
Many of these strategies help democratic leaders protect themselves
against the political risks associated with fiscal consolidation. Douglas
Arnold stresses the importance of designing policies to obfuscate or
share blame.8 7 Hiding painful choices in larger omnibus legislation can
buffer the traceability chain and enable legislators to avoid taking
politically difficult votes. Delegating hard choices to independent bodies
such as commissions or executive agencies is another time-honored
strategy to spread and avoid blame.
VIII. FISCAL RULES
During times of fiscal austerity, formal rules and structures become
more essential for budgeting as the stakes involved with budget
decisions grow. In Europe, for instance, the financial crisis and rapid
deterioration of the fiscal position of the European countries led the
European Union to introduce reforms to strengthen enforcement of
existing fiscal rules through a new Fiscal Compact, which came about in
January 2013. This featured more stringent fiscal balance
requirements, greater centralization of rule making, stronger and more
binding budget frameworks, and harsher penalties. 8 8 Fiscal rules can
serve as a useful supplement to coalitions, replacing folkways and even
moral consensus that used to form the parameters and glue that
sustained a responsible center for budgeting. A recent IMF study shows
that eighty nations have fiscal rules, compared to only seven in 1990.
89
Most have a combination of rules.
Ideally, fiscal rules and institutions can provide additional fiscal
discipline. The rationale is to force all players to internalize the fiscal
effects of their actions. Thus, if a fiscal rule succeeds in forcing
advocates to "pay for" new spending or tax cuts, this in itself could
prevent the unlimited grazing of the fiscal commons by interests who
would otherwise enjoy concentrated benefits.
Fiscal rules can include any of the following: a goal or target for
deficits or debt over time, a set of processes for negotiating the budget
including constraints on fiscal expansions, a set of institutional roles for
86. ORG. FOR EcON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., RESTORING FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY 8

(2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/governance/budgeting/44473800.pdf.
87. DOUGLAS R. ARNOLD, LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 8 (1992).

88. Int'l Monetary Fund, supranote 2, at 12.
89. See Int'l Monetary Fund, Fiscal Rules-Anchoring Expectations for Sustainable
PublicFinances, at 7-9 (Dec. 16, 2009).
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budgetary actors designed to empower guardians over claimants, and
information promoting transparency and accountability for budgetary
outcomes. 90 In many cases, fiscal rules and institutions have the goal of
limiting the choices of democratic leaders, tying their hands to the
proverbial mast to save them and their nations from their own hyperresponsive tendencies. 91 Whether it be delegating choices to a
commission or providing for automatic formulas that trigger fiscal
actions on cue from certain indicators, the not-so-hidden agenda of
many fiscal rules is to compensate for what are perceived to be the fiscal
92
ambivalence of democratic leaders.
Research on fiscal consolidations is mixed, but most studies show
that the coverage and strength of fiscal rules helps promote
consolidation. One study suggests that balanced budget rules are more
important than expenditure rules. 93 Another study suggests that budget
balance requirements enable a more balanced focus on both revenues
and spending. 94 Yet, other studies find that balanced budget
requirements can produce pro-cyclical decisions and be evaded by
classifying various activities as off budget.95
In our case study nations, fiscal rules were instrumental in
enforcing political agreements for consolidation. Canada threatened
agencies with a 10 percent across-the-board cut if the government's
96
proposals for spending cuts from program review were thwarted.
Spending ceilings in Sweden helped the parliament take ownership of
fiscal consolidation and kept the entire framework on track. Surplus
and debt targets in Sweden and New Zealand garnered sufficient
agreement across all political parties to inspire continued retrenchment
where necessary. 97 In the United States, both spending caps and pay-as90. Id. at 5-12.
91. Jirgen von Hagen, European Experiences with Fiscal Rules and Institutions, in
FISCAL CHALLENGES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO BUDGET POLICY 117 (Elizabeth
Garrett et al. eds., 2008).
92. Id. at 116.
93. Xavier Debrun, Laurent Moulin, Alessandro Turrini, Joaquim Ayuso-i-Casals &

Manmohan S. Kumar, Tied to the Mast? National FiscalRules in the European Union, 23
ECON. POL'Y 298, 342 (2008).
94. See generally Larch & Turrini, supra note 29, at 12 (suggesting that budget balance
rules that focus only on expenditures have less significant budgetary impacts).
95. Barry Anderson & Joseph J. Minarik, Design Choices for Fiscal Policy Rules, 5
OECD J. ON BUDGETING 159, 190 (2006).
96. Paul Posner & Matthew Sommerfeld, The Politics of Fiscal Austerity: Democracies
and Hard Choices 25 (Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Governance and Territorial
Dev. Directorate 2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplay
documentpdf/?cote=GOV/PGC/SBO%282012%294&doclanguage=en.
97. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 32, at 11 ('The countries...
studied have generally reached consensus on how they plan to use surpluses .... As part
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you-go (PAYGO) requirements for new legislation enabled national
leaders of both parties to sustain fiscal consolidation for nearly ten
98
years.
Still, it is important to place fiscal rules in perspective. Much as
proponents of such rules desire them to be self-executing, the
effectiveness of rules will ultimately still depend on their alignment and
support with political values and leaders. Wildavsky identified the issue
best-if the budget process is to be changed then one must alter the
underlying political system as well. 99 Irene Rubin reminds us that
"budget reform can help carry out goals of politicians once they have
made up their minds, but it cannot make up their minds."100 As Roy
Meyers has asserted, budget rules are endogenous to the political
system that created them, which constitutes both a strength and a
weakness.1 01
Fiscal rules in democratic systems have an independent effect more
as a reinforcement to the substantive fiscal policy commitments made
by political regimes than as a catalyst for forcing agreement on
discipline and goals. Hallerberg's work shows that fiscal rules are most
appropriate for coalitions where each party is bound to the overall
political regime through contractual commitments. Nevertheless, such
rules become superfluous and often ignored in strong single party
regimes that can rely on a hegemonic direction by the government
leaders. 10 2 Similarly, in the United States, fiscal rules are useful to bind
a coalition to a set of policy goals already agreed to through political
bargaining, but the rules become irrelevant when the political regime
changes. Thus, for instance, the PAYGO and spending caps agreed to in

of their strategies, they have developed explicit goals to guide fiscal policy and have
justified their goals with compelling rationales that often pointed out the potential fiscal
and economic benefits of continued fiscal discipline .... New Zealand and Sweden have
focused on the need to reduce debt as a justification for sustained surpluses.").
98. PAYGO, or pay-as-you-go, "is a budget rule requiring that, relative to current law,
any tax cuts or entitlement and other mandatory spending increases must be paid for by a
tax increase or a cut in mandatory spending." Rudy Penner, Budget Process: What is
PAYGO?, in THE TAX POLICY BRIEFING BOOK: A CITIZENS' GUIDE FOR THE 2012 ELECTION
AND BEYOND (Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, 2011), available at http://www.tax
policycenter.orgbriefing-bookTPC briefingbookjfull.pdf
99. Aaron Wildavsky, PoliticalImplications of Budgetary Reform, 21 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
183, 185 (1961).
100. Irene S. Rubin, Budget Theory and Budget Practice: How Good the Fit?, 50 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 179, 184 (1990).
101. Roy T. Meyers, The "Ball of Confusion" in FederalBudgeting: A Shadow Agenda for
Deliberative Reform of the Budget Process, 69 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 211, 214 (2009).
102. MARK HALLERBERG, Chapter 9 Conclusion: Application of the Fiscal Governance
Approach in Europe and Beyond, in DOMESTIC BUDGETS IN A UNITED EUROPE: FISCAL
GOVERNANCE FROM THE END OF BRETTON WOODS TO EMU 218 (2006).
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1990 were sustained until 2002.103 Yet, these same rules became
superfluous and were disregarded when President George W. Bush
inherited a budget surplus and was able to work exclusively with a
04
Republican-controlled Congress without Democratic Party assistance.1
The recent IMF study on fiscal rules worldwide reflected findings
similar to the U.S. example. In the conclusions, the IMF observes that
political institutions, public opinion, and leadership fundamentally
influence fiscal progress, with rules playing a supplemental and
important role. Many nations adopted rules several years after fiscal
political
to solidify and institutionalize
consolidation began
agreements. 105
IX. THE POLITICAL OUTCOMES OF AUSTERITY
When nations in fact construct and implement credible plans to
reduce spending and increase revenues, the conventional view would
conclude that political leaders have only enacted these measures as a
last resort. And most assuredly, having undertaken a politically
unnatural act, those government leaders would surely not survive
politically for very long after their courageous actions.
Conventional wisdom aside, intriguing studies suggest that not only
have national leaders taken the initiative to pilot consolidation through
the political straits, but they were rewarded electorally as well. Brender
and Drazen's study used data from twenty-three OECD nations from
1960 through 2003 on 164 elections. 106 They found that governments
achieving lower deficits through policy actions actually increased the
probability of their reelection. 10 7 Controlling for changes in the economy,
a reduction of one percentage point in the deficit-to-GDP ratio increased
the probability of reelection for existing regimes by 5.7 percentage
points.108 The authors attribute this surprising finding to the fact that
voters do not like deficits because they perceive that deficits will entail
future tax increases or spending cuts in subsequent years.10 9
A 1998 study by Alesina, Perotti, and Tavares echoed similar
findings. When examining whether governments following tight fiscal
103. ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY AND PROCESS 58 (3rd ed.
2007).
104. Paul L. Posner, Budget Process Reform: Waiting for Godot, 69 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
233, 240 (2009).
105. Int'l Monetary Fund, supra note 89, at 19.
106. Adi Brender & Allan Drazen, PoliticalImplications of Fiscal Performancein OECD
Countries, FISCAL INDICATORS 960 (2007).
107. Id. at 964.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 966.
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policies tend to lose popularity or are replaced in office, the researchers
found a 'loud no" as the answer to both questions. 110 The opposite
proved to be the case: when deficits are reduced, governments that
follow a "cold shower" approach and focus on spending cuts may be
rewarded at the ballot box.1 ' If anything, more radical fiscal
adjustments were associated with a lower probability of a change in
government. 12 The probability of government survival increased during
sharp adjustments that primarily relied on spending cuts, particularly
those involving major components of government wages and
transfers.11 3 Similarly, the nine OECD nations with persistent surpluses
up until the Great Recession achieved surprising political success. As
shown in Table 9, the governments in the nine elections were reelected
in 63 percent of the twenty-four elections in the eight years prior to the
Great Recession. By contrast, nations with the highest deficits during
this year were reelected 40 percent of the time. More importantly, the
governments in surplus nations had far greater success in elections
following the Great Recession. Incumbent governments won in six of
eight elections in the surplus group, but only won in one of the
five elections in the deficit group.

110. Alberto Alesina, Roberto Perotti & Jos6 Tavares, The Political Economy of Fiscal
Adjustments, 1998 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 197, 198 (1998).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 231.
113. Id. at 233.
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Table 9: Electoral success of surplus v. deficit nations

Country

# of times
surplus was
achieved (20002008)

# of times
governing party
changed (20002008)
Change
Electioin
ns
Government

Election after
GFC

Surplus Nations
Australia

9

3

1

Incumbent won

Canada

6

4

1

Incumbent won

Denmark

8

2

0

Opposition won

Finland

9

2

2

Opposition won

Korea

9

5

3

Luxemburg

8

1

0

No election held
yet
Incumbent won

New
Zealand
Norway

9

3

1

Incumbent won

9

2

0

Incumbent won

Sweden

7

2

1

Incumbent won

Deficit Nations
Greece

0

2

1

Portugal

0

2

0

Incumbent
won/lost
Opposition won

Spain
Italy
Hungary

3
0
0

2
2
2

1
3
1

Opposition won
Opposition won
Opposition won

Sources: Nor. Soc. Sci. Data Serv., EuropeanElection Database,http://www.nsd.uib.no/
european election_database/; Nor. Soc. Sci. Data Serv., The MacroDataGuide-An

InternationalSocial Science Resource, http://www.nsd.uib.no/macrodataguide/topic2.html?
code=302&cat=Government%20statistics (last visited June 10, 2015).

Importantly, these governments also closed significant budget gaps
while also winning reelection, in some cases several times over. While
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fiscal austerity was difficult and politically challenging, astute and
savvy leaders developed effective political strategies to build consensus
and gain public support.
Although some nations succeeded in their policies, fiscal austerity
does not come naturally to any system. Rather, the nations that
implemented austerity measures were acutely aware of the fragility of
fiscal restraint and the political vulnerabilities of governments pressing
for continued restraint after years of deficit reduction. Building on this
understanding, in fact, these governments implemented sophisticated
initiatives to build their case by tying fiscal austerity measures to
broader national concerns and anxieties. In particular, each government
explained that deficit reduction and surplus retention were critical to
addressing the nation's concerns about the recent economic crises. 114
A. Factors Contributing to Politically Successful Campaignsfor Fiscal
Retrenchment
It is important to understand what factors help influence
governments to mount politically successful campaigns for fiscal
retrenchment. Considerable thought has gone into explaining why fiscal
choices are so politically unrewarding. It is time for policy analysts and
political scientists to conduct qualitative and quantitative research to
examine the other side of the political equation-how leaders can
structure these choices so they can survive, and even thrive.
As noted earlier, conventional wisdom suggests that leaders have
shortsighted time horizons, and the political rewards of consolidation
are likely to be overshadowed by near-term political reaction. Research
shows that voters are capable of making intertemporal comparisons and
supporting policies requiring short-term deprivation. Leaders have
proven adept at making the link between fiscal consolidation and
economic outcomes that matter to voters, such as low inflation and
growth."5
Keech, among others, argues that political leaders have to exercise
at least a modicum of economic foresight because voters judge them
based on retrospective voting (i.e., how well the economy has done under
the leader's term). Leaders are penalized if rising debt and deficits lead
to higher interest rates, inflation, and currency crises. These factors
114. Paul L. Posner & J6n B1lndal, Democracies & Deficits: Prospects for Fiscal
Responsibility in Democratic Nations, 25 GOVERNANCE: AN INT'L J. POL'Y ADMIN. &
INSTITUTIONS

11, 27 (2012).

115. See Adam Prezeworski, Public Support for Economic Reforms in Poland, 29 COMP.
POL. STUD. 520, 540-41 (1996) (discussing citizens' perceptions of the government's
success as a factor in their voting decisions).
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account for the history of budget balance and fiscal consolidations that
116
have occurred in many democratic regimes.
Indeed, savvy political leaders have proved adept at framing deficit
reduction as an economic growth program. They are able to lay
economic problems such as high interest rates and inflation at the
doorstep of high deficits. 117 The sacrifices involved in fiscal consolidation
must be justified by pointing to prospective economic gains in the near
term, whether it be easing credit market pressures or staving off the
potential for a full-scale exogenous debt crisis. Indeed, if the size and
118
credibility of the package are impressive, the "announcement effect"
creates a self-reinforcing virtuous cycle, prompting financial markets to
lower interest rates at the outset when the consolidation package is
established and enacted.
Of course, any democratically elected official has to be constantly
aware of the public's views on fiscal policy. Leaders can take advantage
of the broader public's ambivalence about fiscal policy and consolidation.
Typically, the public does not like deficits but also has strong support
for continuing current taxes and spending programs. These conflicting
views change in relative salience over time, providing openings for
leaders to mount campaigns.1 1 9
How do leaders reshape the focus of debates? By reframing what the
debate is about. This means changing the definition of the issue by
highlighting the salience of one facet or dimension over others. Shifting
the focus of debates need not entail convincing the other side that they
are wrong in an absolute sense. Rather, it calls for the less demanding
task of shifting the relative priority of different values and priorities
that most of us care about.120
For fiscal policy debates, this means that leaders need not convince
the public that their attachment to low taxes or social security benefits
are misplaced in some absolute sense. Rather, policy change occurs
116. WILLIAM R. KEECH, ECONOMIC POLITICS: THE COSTS OF DEMOCRACY 107 (1995).

117. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 38, at 28-35 (describing the
turning points in Fiscal Policy for several nations).
118. The announcement effect is defined as:
The impact on markets from the news that a change will occur at some
future date. It can be used as a general term for the reaction to any
development that affects trading, such as a change in dividend policy
or a stock split. It is most often used, however, to describe investor
reactions to changes in monetary policy, such as a hike or cut in a key
interest rate level.
Announcement Effect, INVESTOPEDIA, http:/www.investopedia.comltermsalannouncment-

effect.asp (last visited June 2, 2015).
119. Posner, supra note 12, at 23.
120. TIMOTHY J. CONLAN, PAUL L. POSNER & DAVID R. BEAM, THE PATHWAYS OF POWER:
THE DYNAMICS OF NATIONAL POLICYMAKING 131 (2014).
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when leaders succeed in showing the consequences of these policy
attachments for other values to which broader publics are equally
attached, namely fiscal and economic sustainability.
CONCLUSIONS

A. Analysis of Future Challenges
Daunting challenges lie ahead in the next several decades for
democratic nations and their leaders. Fiscal retrenchment calls for a
level of sacrifice that tests the foresight and resolve of a democracy.
Near-term economic pressures have combined with longer-term secular
forces to prompt the need for periodic episodes of fiscal consolidation. As
the role of government in the social and economic lives of nations has
grown, so have the stakes of budgeting. Accordingly, the choices have
become more difficult, even while the number of stakeholders and the
pathways to power have become more diverse. Politics is far less
predictable and decisionmaking far more open than ever before.
Notwithstanding these forces, the magnitude of the fiscal challenges
has heightened the importance of early action and foresight in fiscal
policymaking. The best way to effectively deal with the economic forces
that aging societies face is to make timely decisions that have the broad
support of as many interest groups and actors as possible. Making such
decisions poses enormous difficulties, as summoning publics to support
fiscal sacrifice is a task that carries liability for leaders in any
democracy. There is no way to underestimate the difficulties this poses
for democratically elected leaders. And there are certainly many cases
where democratic nations-including our own-have failed to rise to
this challenge.
The question facing democracies is whether there is a sustainable
politics that can provide support and incentives for political leaders to
make hard choices in a timely fashion. Traditional models of
policymaking are generally based on the twin principles of
incrementalism and negative feedback. 121 Leading political scientists
such as Charles Lindblom concluded that the policy process has a
conserving bias stemming both from political interests as well as
institutional routines that structure and channel change. 122 In the
United States, the Madisonian system's checks and balances reinforce a

121. FRANK. R. BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 4-6 (1993).
122. See MICHAEL T. HAYES, THE LIMITS OF POLICY CHANGE: INCREMENTALISM,

WORLDVIEW, AND THE RULE OF LAW 6, 40, 176 (2001).
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perception of a system where major change must overcome numerous
123
hurdles, sometimes called veto points.
Until recently, passing the federal budget was characterized as an
incremental process. In the traditional works by Wildavsky and Fenno,
budgeting at the federal level primarily focused on shifts in resources at
the margin from the base. This characterization depicts a resource
allocation process that corresponds to a largely pluralist world, where
narrow interests prevail and where policy changes largely occur, if at
124
all, only on the margin.
Recent work suggests that budgeting is far from incremental;
rather, the budgeting process is characterized by dramatic and episodic
shifts in resources for major programs. Baumgartner and Jones find
that budget decisions for policy areas can veer from several years of
stability to sharp periods of rapid change, corresponding to elections,
economic and social changes, and major reframing of policy issues. 125
The stakes involved with budget decisions have grown exponentially
as government's roles in the social and economic life of their nations
have expanded in recent decades. While appropriations decisions still
largely operate within the pluralist pathways, the calm world of
appropriations has been supplanted by mandatory entitlements whose
character does not lend themselves to marginal changes, particularly
when small cuts from growing baselines prompt widespread
mobilization. Wildavsky's later editions recognized this shift by noting
that the consensual base for budgeting had been replaced by budgetary
dissensus over fundamentals.1 26
B. Multiplicationof Pathways to Power
The multiplication of arenas that incubate and mobilize broader
publics to support policy reforms and fiscal changes alike reflect the
presence of a more fluid and dynamic policy process. These multiple
arenas draw on what the co-author and several colleagues have
characterized as four "pathways to power": pluralist, partisan, expert,
123. See id. at 19 (discussing incremental change in U.S. policymaking and factors
contributing to deviations from this pattern).
124. See WILDAVSKY, supra note 77, at 136; RICHARD F. FENNO, THE POWER OF THE
PURSE: APPROPRIATIONS POLITICS IN CONGRESS 267 (1966).

125. See generally James L. True, Bryan D. Jones & Frank R. Baumgartner,
Punctuated-EquilibriumTheory: Explaining Stability and Change in Public Policymaking,
in THEORIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS 155 (Paul A. Sabatier ed., 2007) (discussing the
dynamics governing departures from incrementalism and stability in policymaking).
126. See generally AARON WILDAVSKY & NAOMI CAIDEN, THE NEW POLITICS OF THE
BUDGETARY PROCESS 93-124 (2001) (analyzing the intensified polarization and
unprecedented manifestations of dissensus occurring in the 1980s).
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and symbolic. 127 In this model the authors characterize four pathways to
power characterized by two dimensions-the scope and scale of
mobilization (whether specialized or mass) and the method of
mobilization (principally, whether interests or ideas were at play).
These dimensions suggest that policies come to the agenda and
enactment through four discrete pathways of power as shown in Table
10.
Table 10: The pathways to power
Scope of
mobilization / Basis
of mobilization
Interests
Ideas

Narrow

Broad

Pluralist
Expert

Partisan
Symbolic

The pluralist pathway was the political and institutional grounding
for public choice theory and incrementalism, as the relevant interest
groups and other specialized actors in appropriations committees and
agencies exercised hegemonic influence and control over discrete
budgetary areas, ranging from veterans to public health to
transportation. 1 28 In some respects, much of the pessimism over the
potential for fiscal retrenchment and the adoption of policy reforms
stems from the rather static view of the policy process as being captured
129
by narrow pluralistic interests.
The other three pathways have emerged as alternative bases for
mobilizing publics on behalf of fiscal and policy change. Party leaders
have traditionally been conceived as the major broad-based change
agents, capable, through leadership, of mobilizing broad publics to
outflank and shift the framing of issues away from the narrow confines
of pluralistic bastions. In the United States and several other nations,
however, polarization has caused this pathway to lose vitality as a
source of major policy change. Gridlock and stalemate provide little
basis for fiscal reform or policy change in democratic systems.

127. See generally CONLAN, POSNER & BEAM, supra note 120 (providing an in-depth
analysis of the four distinct pathways to power and examining the interaction between
each pathway and the dynamics of policymaking).
128. See generally JOHN F. COGAN ET AL., THE BUDGET PUZZLE: UNDERSTANDING

FEDERAL SPENDING (1994) (analyzing budget policymaking from a "microbudgeting"
approach that breaks the budget down into its distinct components to review each
program or account).
129. See CONLAN, POSNER & BEAM, supra note 120, at 18.
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Idea-based pathways that have emerged in recent decades offer an
alternative for reframing policy issues and providing new ways to
change the political calculus of consent. Public officials have become
increasingly attracted to symbolic budgetary proposals to position
themselves on the "right side" of fiscal, tax, or entitlement policy issues.
Ideas in this pathway are championed not for their technical adequacy
but for their potential to appeal to widely shared values or moods, often
providing deceptively simple or apparently costless approaches to
wrenching budgetary choices. When issues fall into the expert pathway,
professional knowledge and technical feasibility become the source of
legitimacy against which all proposals are based. Experts' roles in the
process are fortified by the growing need for credible numbers and
models to understand increasingly complex relationships between
federal programs, the economy, and performance outcomes.
Secular changes in institutions have promoted greater potential for
pathway shifting in democratic systems than ever before. More
competition among interest groups in the pluralist pathway, more
media outlets vying for audience share in the symbolic pathway, greater
presence and salience of experts, and more competition among elected
officials anxious to use policy issues to fortify their standing with
various publics have all heightened the potential for policy change.
Greater competition among these actors prompts actors to switch
pathways to gain strategic advantage.
In the United States at least, the increasing fluidity of the policy
process prompted the adoption of major reforms in the fiscal arena as
well as other policy domains. A diverse array of policy actors was able to
break through the many obstacles of the U.S. system to achieve nonincremental reforms-without a crisis for the most part. Table 11 shows
the inventory of domestic policy reforms achieved in the past thirty-four
years in the U.S. system.

THE POLITICS OF FISCAL AUSTERITY

Table 11: Crisis and policy reforms 1981-2010

1982 TEFRA

-N

Undo Fart of 1981 Reagan Tax Cuts

1983 Social Security
Reform

?

Save Social Security from trust fund depletion

1986 Tax Reform

N

Reagan initiated reform to broaden base of tax code

1988 Medicare
Catastrophy

N

Provide seniors with catastrophic and drug coverage

1990 OBRA

?

Over $500 billion in bipartisan deficit cuts stemming
from bond market pressures

1990 Clean Air Act

Cuts in acid rain through cap and trade

1993 NAFTA

Bipartisan treaty negotiated by President Bush and
pushed through by Clinton

1993 Deficit Red

Nearly $500 billion in deficit reduction achieved by
Clinton and Congressional Democrats

1996 TANF

Welfare reform achieved through bipartisan change

1996 Farm Reform

No

Ramping down of subsidies through bipartisan
change

1996 Telecommunications' No
Reform

Congressional action to spur competition in industry

1997 Balanced Budget Act No

Bipartisan deficit reduction includes tax cuts and
Medicare cuts

2002 DHS

Stand up DHS in response to 9-11

2002 Sarbanes-Oxley

Financial market reforms in response to Enron crisis

2010 Health Reform

President Obama's signature reform

2010 Financial Reform

Reforms instigated by 2008 financial crisis

Source: Developed by the author based on all of the major policy reforms enacted in the
past thirty years across major policy areas. Policies chosen were those where major
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changes were ushered in causing reductions or shifts in policy benefits previously enjoyed
by narrow-based interests. As such, these policies represent the difficult choices in U.S.
policymaking. Policies excluded were such items as the Bush tax cuts or 2002 Farm
Reform where the primary thrust was to restore or provide new benefits to specific
interests. The list was developed based on that of "major" policy changes defined in DAVID
MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1978) (examining the connection
between Members of Congress' levels of engagement in major policy changes and the
motivating goal of reelection).

Just as policy claimants have used symbolic and expert pathways to
mobilize support for new entitlements and tax cuts, fiscal guardians and
political leaders have proved equally adept at conscripting those
arguments and mobilization strategies to make the case for fiscal
consolidation and policy reform Fiscal consolidation strategies and
arguments have gained strength thanks to the savvy use of more open
policymaking processes to reach broader publics. Leaders have a greater
chance to frame their case for fiscal austerity in terms that broad
publics can support.
C. Looking Ahead
Given the high stakes involved with the democratic response to
deficits, more research is needed to explore how democratic nations
achieve fiscal reform. It is also important to better understand how such
fiscal consolidation initiatives are thwarted and delayed. The
conventional wisdom may be exactly right in predicting a difficult road
for those who champion fiscal consolidation in the United States and
elsewhere. Indeed, nations in Europe such as Greece and Portugal
illustrate that procrastination in confronting fiscal challenges
characterizes the initial response of many democracies facing incipient
deficits.
Those who would predict frustration and gridlock over fiscal
consolidation may be correct most of the time. But they are wrong at
crucial times-and these are the times when democratic systems can
quickly break through barriers to achieve significant fiscal progress and
reform. Understanding when those turning points occur and how to
promote politically sustainable shifts in fiscal policy are the central
tasks facing democratic systems and their leaders.
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